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Automatic Disbarment: A Convicted
Felon's Just Desserts
By MICHAEL A. GENTILE*
AND SARAH DIANE MCSHEA**
Introduction
It is indeed ironic that at a time when public confidence in the hon-
esty and integrity of lawyers is at its lowest, we should be called upon to
defend one of the most reasonable and reliable procedures yet devised for
ousting from the Bar those practitioners who are clearly dishonest, un-
trustworthy or unfit. We speak, of course, of the felony disbarment rule.
Generally cited with admiration and approval, statutes1 mandating
the automatic or summary disbarment of convicted felons have, from
time to time, drawn criticism and aroused controversy. Not surprisingly,
one of the foremost opponents of felony disbarment is the legal profes-
sion's conservative bastion and powerful protector: the American Bar
* Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, First Department. B.A. Brooklyn College; J.D. Brooklyn Law
School. Formerly Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Investigations, Kings County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, 1971-80.
** Deputy Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York, First Department. B.A. Yale University; J.D. Boston Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. The jurisdictions mandating disbarment upon conviction of a felony or "moral turpi-
tude" offense include the District of Columbia, Mississippi and New York. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11-2503 (1981) (moral turpitude); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-41 (1972); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 90(4) (McKinney 1983).
California permits summary disbarment of attorneys convicted of felonies, but only if 1)
an element of the felony is "to deceive, defraud, steal or make or suborn a false statement" and
2) the offense is committed in the practice of law or against a client. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6102(c) (West Supp. 1986). Since this provision was added in 1985, no decisions have been
handed down indicating whether a separate hearing will be necessary to determine the ele-
ments of the felony and its connection with the practice of law.
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals issues an order to show cause why an attorney should
not be disbarred once he is convicted of a felony. Taking into account the attorney's response
and the circumstances of the case, the court may then suspend the attorney pending the out-
come of a disciplinary hearing. MD. ANN. CODE, MD. RULES BV16 (1985).
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Association. Like Professor Abramovsky,2 the ABA proposes that law-
yers convicted of felonies be afforded mitigation hearings and an oppor-
tunity to avoid disbarment.3
We think this position is misguided and premised upon the false
notion that disciplinary proceedings serve some purpose other than pro-
tection of the public and the reputation of the bar. While concerns about
the careers and rehabilitation of troubled practitioners are laudable in-
deed, they have little place in a discussion about the licenses of convicted
felons to practice law. Not only is there no constitutional bar to the
felony disbarment rule, but neither fairness nor justice require that the
legal profession descend further in public esteem to preserve lawyers'
licenses.
I. New York's Felony Disbarment Rule
What are, and what should be, the consequences of a felony convic-
tion to a lawyer's license to practice law? For well over one hundred
years, New York has provided one answer to this question: immediate
and automatic disbarment.4 It is the unwavering view of the New York
courts and legislature that a lawyer convicted of a felony cannot be per-
mitted to remain at the bar.5 At the moment of his conviction, a New
York lawyer ceases to be an attorney.6 No intervening act is required by
any disciplinary authority or any court.7 Justice was never swifter and,
we would urge, never fairer.
II. Why Felony Disbarment Is Constitutional
The United States Constitution does not require that attorneys con-
victed of felonies be afforded evidentiary hearings before being disbarred
or suspended. One hundred years ago, Justice Bradley eloquently ex-
pressed the moral and professional sensibilities of his day: "If regularly
convicted of a felony, an attorney will be struck off the roll as [a matter]
2. See Abramovsky, A Case Against Automatic Disbarment, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
415, 417 (1986).
3. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEED-
INGS (1979); ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1986).
4. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1983); In re E., 65 How. Pr. 171, 172 (1879); In
re Niles, 48 How. Pr. 246, 251-52 (1875).
5. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1983).
6. Id.
7. In re Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 146-47, 134 N.E.2d 193, 194, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361,362-63
(1956) (striking lawyer's name from roll of attorneys "is no more than a formal recording of
the existing fact of disbarment. It is a solemn pronouncement but not a new adjudication.");
In re Sweeney, 95 A.D.2d 579, 580, 467 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586 (1983) (the law is "self-executing").
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of course, whatever the felony may be, because he is rendered infa-
mous."' We submit that, Professor Abramovsky's views notwithstand-
ing,9 the law is no different today. An attorney regularly convicted of a
felony may be disbarred summarily, without offense to either the federal
Constitution or modern notions of justice.
The justification for automatic and mandatory felony disbarment is
clear. As the New York Court of Appeals wrote in In re Mitchell, 10
affirming the disbarment of the former Attorney General of the United
States upon his conviction of perjury and obstruction of justice, "[t]o
permit a convicted felon to continue to appear in our courts ... would
not 'advance the ends of justice', but instead would invite scorn and dis-
respect for our rule of law."11 The court affirmed the constitutionality of
both the felony disbarment rule and its application before the appeal was
exhausted. 12 Without citing In re Ming, 13 Mitchell rejected Ming's prem-
ise that a criminal conviction could not serve as the predicate for profes-
sional discipline until it was final, that is, until all appeals were
completed. 14 The court upheld the fairness of the felony disbarment
rule, finding that the "concern for the protection of the public interest far
outweighs any interest the convicted attorney has in continuing to earn a
livelihood in his chosen profession."15 In balancing an attorney's interest
in his law license-an interest that the New York Court of Appeals has
recently described as a "property" interest' 6 -against the public interest
in maintaining the honor and integrity of the legal profession, the law-
yer's right to his license inevitably will be less important, particularly
when the lawyer is a convicted felon. Even the Ming court, troubled by
the summary suspension of an attorney convicted of a misdemeanor of-
fense, side-stepped the clearly distinguishable issue of the convicted
felon's right to practice law, apparently recognizing the fundamentally
8. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1882).
9. See Abramovsky, supra, note 2.
10. 40 N.Y.2d 153, 351 N.E.2d 743, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976).
11. Id. at 156, 351 N.E.2d at 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
12. Id. at 157, 351 N.E.2d at 746, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
13. In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972). See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 422.
14. Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d at 157, 351 N.E.2d at 746, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (strong "presump-
tion of regularity" attaches to judgment of conviction).
15. Id. at 156, 351 N.E.2d at 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 97; see also In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32,
36, 446 A.2d 1208, 1210 (1982).
16. In re Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549, 553, 453 N.E.2d 497, 499, 466 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269
(1983); accord In re Seiffert, 65 N.Y.2d 278, 480 N.E.2d 734, 491 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1985); cf.
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1276-78 (1985) (for purposes of Privileges
and Immunities Clause, right to practice law is a "fundamental" right).
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different implications of misdemeanor and felony offenses.
17
In criticizing the felony disbarment rule, Professor Abramovsky first
focuses on issues of due process.18 This attack relies heavily upon the
dicta in Ming and upon a plethora of eminently quotable sentiments ar-
ticulated in various "due process" cases. However, except for an isolated
Eighth Circuit case,19 the constitutional objections to automatic or
mandatory disbarment have foundered utterly.
In United States v. Jennings,20 the Fifth Circuit, citing In re Mitchell
with approval, severely criticized Ming for failing adequately to consider
the importance of both the "public interest in avoiding the appearance of
impropriety in the legal profession,"2 and the interests of the convicted
attorney's clients.22 The court rejected Ming's assumption that an attor-
ney's interest in his license is as great as an alien's interest in avoiding
deportation.23 Jennings concluded that, under the particular facts of the
case, due process did not require a separate hearing to suspend the con-
victed attorney's license.24
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Friedland,25 affirmed without
opinion a lower court ruling upholding the constitutionality of summary
discipline upon a felony conviction. Like many other observers, the New
Jersey district court rejected Ming in favor of Mitchell, finding it "intol-
erable that a convicted felon should be permitted to engage in the prac-
tice of law."26
Despite arguments to the contrary, the lawyer convicted of felonious
conduct has had due process of law. He received ample notice of the
charges in an indictment or criminal information. He had a full opportu-
nity to contest the charges before a jury or trial judge-unless he chose to
plead guilty. The consequences of his felony conviction were well known
to him before trial or plea. He faced not only loss of his law license, but
17. In re Ming, 469 F.2d at 1355 n.2 ("We do not here consider whether such summary
disbarment or suspension for conviction of a felony violates due process.").
18. Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 419-26.
19. In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1974).
20. 724 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2682 (1984).
21. Id. at 449.
22. Id. at 450.
23. Id. at 449-50.
24. Id. at 451. In so holding the court found persuasive several factors unique to the case:
the defendant was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude (fraud); the judge who ordered
suspension of the defendant's license also presided over the defendant's trial; and the defendant
did not raise the due process argument at sentencing even though he was given a chance to do
SO.
25. 502 F. Supp. 611 (D.N.J. 1980), afl'd mem. 672 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1981); see also In re
Stoner, 507 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
26. Friedland, 502 F. Supp. at 617.
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also the risk of incarceration for a substantial period of time, the loss of
all civil rights and the forfeiture of public office.
27
The loss of a law license upon conviction of a felony is not an addi-
tional "penalty" imposed upon the lawyer for his criminal conduct.
28
Rather, disbarment under such circumstances may more aptly be de-
scribed as a "loss of status." There is therefore little point in conducting
hearings at which the convicted felon can put forth mitigating evidence,
explain the circumstances of his criminal conduct and demonstrate his
hitherto good character and unblemished record. The New York legisla-
ture-and the legislatures of other jurisdictions mandating disbarment
under similar eircumstanee29--view a felony conviction as conclusive
evidence of unfitness to practice law. There is no constitutional infirmity
in this per se disqualification of convicted felons.
Professor Abramovsky's second constitutional attack, predicated
upon the Equal Protection Clause, fares no better. He argues that the
automatic felony disbarment rule improperly discriminates against law-
yers since other professionals do not similarly have their licenses revoked
upon conviction. 30 This argument fails on two levels. First, disbarment
clearly withstands the rational basis test. Further, even if disbarment
were subject to strict scrutiny, it would survive.
Under the traditional test, equal protection analysis requires only
that the statutory classification have a "rational basis" and that it not
rest on "grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's ob-
jective."31 In other words, the classification must be rationally related to
some legitimate governmental purpose.3 2 The automatic disbarment of
attorneys convicted of felony offenses clearly survives constitutional scru-
tiny under this test. In New York, a felony conviction has long been
conclusive evidence that the defendant is not only unfit to practice law
but unfit to hold any public office. In Toro v. Makolm, 33 for example,
New York's Court of Appeals affirmed the automatic termination of a
state corrections officer upon his conviction of a felony. Although the
officer's conviction was eventually reversed and he was reinstated, the
27. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79 (McKinney 1976); De Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144, 158-59 (1960); cf Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
28. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1882). Contra In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550
(1968) ("Disbarment... is a punishment imposed on the lawyer.").
29. See supra note 1.
30. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 426-28.
31. People v. Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d 457, 460, 415 N.E.2d 927, 928, 434 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938
(1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
32. See, e.g., People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640, 409 N.E.2d 840, 431 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1980).
33. 44 N.Y.2d 146, 375 N.E.2d 739, 404 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1978).
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court upheld the statutory termination provision and denied back pay.
In weighing the interests of the felonious officer against the public inter-
est, the court stated: "the balance must be struck in favor of the public's
right to rest assured that its officers are individuals of moral integrity in
whom they may, without second thought, place their confidence and
trust."' 34 We strike the same balance in weighing the public interest in
the integrity of the legal profession against the felon's interest in his law
license.
Automatic disbarment should not be subject to strict scrutiny.
Equal protection analysis requires enhanced judicial review for
legislation affecting suspect classifications 35 or fundamental interests.
36
Clearly, attorneys are not members of a suspect class. Further, the prac-
tice of law is not a fundamental right, but a privilege.3 7 Thus strict scru-
tiny is inappropriate.
Even though strict scrutiny is inappropriate, automatic disbarment
would nonetheless withstand such scrutiny. The stricter test requires
that the challenged law be "necessary to promote a compelling govern-
ment interest.",38  Felony disbarment promotes a compelling interest.
The attorney is "an instrument ... to advance the ends of justice.
'39
Surely justice is a compelling state interest. Just as surely is that interest
thwarted when the very agents of justice demonstrate their contempt for
the law by committing felonies. In addition, the attorney owes a high
duty of loyalty and fidelity to his client." The client's right to an attor-
ney may rise to constitutional dimension.41 Surely the compelling state
interest in affording citizens the right to counsel would be frustrated if
felons were placed in such high positions of trust.
New York's disciplinary scheme has previously withstood an equal
34. Id. at 152, 375 N.E.2d at 742, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 562; see also Gunning v. Codd, 49
N.Y.2d 495, 403 N.E.2d 1208, 427 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1980).
35. Such as race, alienage or nationality. Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d at 460, 415 N.E.2d at 928,
434 N.Y.S.2d at 938; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
36. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
37. People ex rel Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928); see also
Sams v. OIah, 225 Ga. 497, 504-05, 169 S.E.2d 790, 798 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914
(1970); Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187, 193, 148 N.W.2d 621, 625 (1967).
Contra In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 90-91, 397 P.2d 205, 206-07 (1964); In re Schaengold, 83
Nev. 65, 68-69, 422 P.2d 686, 688 (1967).
38. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).
39. Karlin, 248 N.Y. at 471, 162 N.E. at 489.
40. Gay v. Heller, 252 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1958).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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protection attack. In Mildner v. Gulotta42 a federal district court rejected
the argument out of hand. In disciplining professionals, the court wrote,
"the State may legitimately find reason to conclude that differing proce-
dural safeguards are appropriate for different professions."43
Lawyers are officers of the court and guardians of the legal process.
They should be held to the highest standards of personal and professional
honesty and obedience to the law. Should hairdressers or hot dog ven-
dors or even doctors be held to the same standard? If not, are we obliged
to relax our expectations of lawyers? We think not.
In support of his proposal requiring mitigation hearings for all attor-
neys convicted of felonies, Professor Abramovsky cites two examples of
convictions that might not lead to disbarment if the attorney had an op-
portunity to be heard: the recidivist drunk driver and the barroom
brawler." Arguably neither one has committed acts which have any
bearing upon his professional ethics or his character and fitness to be an
attorney. Should these attorneys, then, be automatically disbarred? We
say they must: they are convicted felons. If their offenses were not so
serious, they should not have been classified by the state legislature as
felonies. The remedy is not to repeal the felony disbarment rule, but to
re-examine our penal codes.
The barroom brawler, that is, the lawyer convicted of second-degree
assault rather than third-degree assault, which is a misdemeanor, must
live with the consequences of his action. The legislature has seen fit to
label a felony what might otherwise have been an isolated and aberra-
tional outburst. We are willing to live with an occasional harsh result-
and so are the people and courts of New York-because the salutary
effects of the felony disbarment rule are so great.
III. The Practical Effects of Disbarment
In addition to constitutional matters, there are practical considera-
tions which may affect the way the reader will view the plight of the
felonious lawyer. First, most of those involved in the criminal justice
system believe-if on no other basis than their common experience-that
most defendants are factually guilty of the crimes they are accused of
42. 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), cerL denied, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (state may legiti-
mately deny appellate review to lawyers while providing appeals for other disciplined
professionals).
43. Id. at 193. Unlike other professionals, a lawyer's criminal conviction "compromises
his position in the community." In re Williams, 105 A.D.2d 974, 975, 481 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531
(1984).
44. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 418-19.
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committing. This argument undercuts Professor Abramovsky's concern
about the innocent lawyer who is "compelled" to plead guilty to a misde-
meanor to avoid the risk of a felony conviction and automatic disbar-
ment.a" In all likelihood, the accused lawyer does not deserve this
sympathy. Our second practical observation is that, for several reasons,
an attorney is in a better position than a nonattorney. Unlike the lay-
man, the accused lawyer has a bargaining chip in the criminal process,
namely, his license to practice. Second, as an attorney he is in a better
position to evaluate his legal predicament. Once proceedings have be-
gun, the nonattorney must rely solely on the advice of his counsel. Fur-
ther, the attorney should be more aware of the legal consequences of his
conduct before any act is committed. The rule that ignorance of the law
(and its consequences) is no excuse should apply with special force to
attorneys.
The public has an important interest in the integrity of the legal
profession46 and a "compelling interest in regulating our system of justice
to assure high standards of professional conduct."'4 7 Citizens and nonci-
tizens alike are more dependent than ever upon the presumed integrity
and honesty of lawyers-their own and their adversaries'. Judges depend
upon the integrity of the counsel who appear before them,48 and govern-
ment agencies rely upon the personal and professional ethics of advocates
pleading their clients' various causes. We resolve many of our con-
flicts-personal, economic, social and political-through the legal system
and with the aid of lawyers. It is therefore essential that lawyers be trust-
worthy and, more importantly, that we perceive them to be so.
Conclusion
Convicted felons face disbarment first and foremost because, as Pro-
fessor Drinker once wrote, their continuation at the bar "would be a
'scandal and contempt' to the court or an outrage to the profession."4 9
Many criminal offenses also demonstrate that an attorney is dishonest
and lacks integrity, and therefore that he poses a direct danger to his
clients and the public. Yet the primary reason for disbarring convicted
felons is that their continued presence at the bar arouses well-founded
suspicions concerning the honesty and integrity of every other lawyer.
45. Id. at 114-15.
46. See, e.g., In re Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279, 333 N.E.2d 350, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1975).
47. In re Anonymous Attorneys, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 362 N.E.2d 592, 597, 393 N.Y.S.2d
961, 965 (1977).
48. Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982).
49. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmics 44 (1953).
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The public's trust in the honesty and integrity of lawyers is abso-
lutely critical to the legal profession's ability to assist in the resolution of
conf icts and the dispensation of justice. Every lawyer convicted of a
felony brings dishonor upon his colleagues. Automatic disbarment of
convicted felons protects the public because it serves notice to the profes-
sion that "certain conduct will not be tolerated and is thereby an assur-
ance to the public that, as far as known, certain taints do not exist,
because, if discovered, they would be eradicated."50
In jurisdictions that do not disbar felons-and sadly they are a ma-
jority in this country-there is a rampant public cynicism about the in-
tegrity of the bar. This distrust undermines the effectiveness of all
lawyers in their representation of clients and ultimately has dire conse-
quences for the legal system as a whole.
While such cynicism may be found in New York, lawyers can with
some pride and confidence maintain that lawyers convicted of felonies
are reliably and routinely disbarred. With the assurance of discipline and
professional sanctions for professional misconduct comes, slowly but
surely, public trust in the profession. While there remains ample room
for improvement in the disciplinary system, it would seem the height of
self-destructiveness to retreat from a position that has only enhanced the
legal profession's public image.
50. In re Nearing, 16 A.D.2d 516, 518, 229 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (1962).

